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USWhat kinds of social and economic systems are most conducive to innovation?We formulate a simple model in
which countries can close the gap with the technological leader, but where the cost of doing so may be so high
that the country chooses to remain laggards. Observed disparities in productivity may be the result of a recogni-
tion that the cost of closing the gap exceeds beneﬁt and theremay therefore exist an international equilibrium in
which there are leaders and followers. Even if it is granted that the United States is the leader and Scandinavia are
followers, there are theoretical grounds for arguing that the Nordic model may in fact be better for innovation,
suggesting that if the US adopted some of the Nordic institutions, innovationswould be higher, and societal wel-
fare would be improved even more.
© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
There are marked differences in productivity across ﬁrms and coun-
tries. We look up to the “leaders,” those who are at the technological
frontier and who are pushing that frontier ever forward. The laggards
are urged to emulate the leaders. And yet, it is not apparent that it is op-
timal for them to do so. The lagging countries beneﬁt from the lower
prices that result from competition among the leaders. And both lagging
countries and ﬁrms can beneﬁt from the learning that results from the
investments in R & D and innovation of the leading ﬁrms, with far
lower expenditures.
Even if proﬁts atﬁrmsor standards of living in countries that are per-
sistent leaders were persistently higher than those of ﬁrms that were
persistent followers, it would not mean that the followers should
change their corporate or national strategies. For there is a cost to catch-
up—large investments in learning—and these costs maywell exceed the
differences in proﬁts.undertaken with my colleague
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nd Quitze Valenzuela-Stookey.This paper asks three central questions:
(a) What kinds of policies and institutional arrangements—what
kind of economic systems—aremost conducive to being an inno-
vation leader—not just obtaining patents, but designing an inno-
vation system that generates large and persistent increases in
standards of living? Is it cut-throat competition? Or is the more
gentle Nordic model, in which government takes on a larger
role and inwhich a broad array of policies provides social protec-
tion and results in less inequality,more conducive to innovation?
(b) Should we expect that the policies of the follower differ from
those of the leader, and if so, in what ways? Can we explain the
successes of the Nordic model as a result of its policies being
well adapted for the leader, or for the follower?
(c) Can there be an equilibrium inwhich some countries persistently
remain leaders, and others followers? If so, can we say anything
about the nature of the equilibrium and the kinds of policies pur-
sued by each in that equilibrium?
Acemoglu et al. (2012) have recently put forward the hypothesis that
the Nordic welfare model may be all well and good for the follower, but
the American style of cutthroat capitalism,with its high level of inequality
and strong incentives, is better suited for the countries at the frontier.
While contentions of such a broad sweep are hard to evaluate with any
precision, similar sentiments have played a central role in policy debates
and therefore it is important to assess them, marshaling whatever theo-
retical, empirical, and historical arguments can be brought to bear on
the issue. We thus begin with a general theoretical analysis (in
Section 2) of why (i) unfettered markets are not likely to engage either
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policies—including those that have characterized the Nordic countries—
can and should play an important role.We follow thiswith a broad histor-
ical discussion and a closer look at (a) whether it is as clear as, say,
Acemoglu et al. suggest that the US is in fact the technological leader;
and (b) if so, to what that should be attributed. Section 3 provides an his-
torical perspective on the U.S. experience.
Section 4 turns to the formulation of a leader/follower model in
which there is a steady statewith constant growth characterized byper-
sistent differences in standards of living, without any convergence.
This analysis turns on its head a central contention of neoclassical
growth theory since the work of Solow (1956), arguing that countries
with different initial conditions should converge. In fact, the evidence
on convergence has been disappointing.1 Our theory explains this ab-
sence of convergence.
In the leader–follower equilibrium, it is optimal for laggard countries
to remain laggards, and never catch up. They sufﬁciently beneﬁt from
the dissemination of knowledge from the leader that it doesn't make
sense for them tomake the “Big Push” to join the club of leaders. But, ex-
cept in some limiting cases, the followers are not fully passive—they
pursue policies designed to close the gap between themselves and the
leader, but even as they do so, the leader pursues policies that open
the gap further. Not surprisingly, even though both leaders and fol-
lowers pursue “innovation” policies, the policies that are optimal for
each can bemarkedly different from those of the leader.We end the sec-
tion with a discussion of several examples of such differences, but ob-
serve that the Nordic model may (with suitable adaptations) be
desirable not only for leaders, but also followers.
We should emphasize at the onset that while we talk about leaders
and followers, our characterization is too stark. Knowledge is multi-
dimensional. Some ﬁrm/country could be on the knowledge frontier
along some dimension, but well within the frontier on another. That is
certainly true among countries that claim to be “at” or “near” the frontier,
implying that they have a considerable amount to learn from each other.2. Market failures and innovation theory and policy
2.1. Market failures and innovation
The fundamental theorems of economics argued for the (Pareto) efﬁ-
ciency of a competitive market economy. But the Arrow–Debreu model
had nothing to say about innovation—the state of technology was
assumedgiven. Schumpter (1943)had argued that contrary to theﬁnding
of standard welfare economics, monopolies (or more accurately, a
sequence of monopolies, where ﬁrms competed to be the monopolist)
were desirable, because they maximized the pace of innovation. A host
of studies have shown that Schumpeter's conclusions were wrong,2 and1 The empirical literature on convergence is complex (See DeLong, 1988; Durlauf and
Quah, 1999; Dowrick and Nguyen, 1989; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991; Mankiw et al.,
1992; Im and Rosenblatt, 2013). This literature focuses on countries with the same pro-
duction functions, assuming that knowledge ﬂows freely across boundaries. It is precisely
this question upon which Section 4 of this paper focuses.
2 Schumpeter claimed, moreover, that monopolies would be only temporary, and that
competition to be the monopolist spurred innovation. Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980a)
showed that monopolies have the ability and incentives to persist, and Fudenberg et al.
(1983), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988), and Stiglitz (1987a) show that incumbents can deter
entrywith only limited investments in innovation. Still, Schumpeterwas partially correct:
in a wide variety of circumstances, more competitive markets may be less innovative.
Greenwald and Stiglitz (2014) develop several reasons for this: (a) while overall produc-
tion for a monopolist is smaller, the production of each ﬁrm is larger, and incentives to in-
novate, e.g. for cost reducing innovation, are related to the scale of production of the ﬁrm.
(b) The expected returns to investments in innovation depend on the chances of success,
and that may be decreased if there is more competition in the innovation market (simply
because there are more competitors.) But there are forces also going the other way: with
imperfectly correlated research strategies among different ﬁrms, the more ﬁrms engaged
in innovation, the higher the probability of success. And monopolies may suffer from
“agency” problems (Hart, 1983): competition can be a spur to effort, e.g. as in a contest
(Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983).that the endogenous market structure and the associated levels and pat-
terns of innovation arrived at by the market (which may be a monopoly
or an oligopoly) can be improved upon by government intervention.
It should come as no surprise that markets are not efﬁcient, since,
with or without patents,3 social and private returns to innovation are
markedly different, partly because of the difﬁculties of appropriating
all the returns to innovation—knowledge spillovers are pervasive; part-
ly because much of the returns that are appropriated are rents that oth-
erwise would have accrued to other ﬁrms. Imperfections of risk and
capital markets and of competition are othermarket failures that are in-
herently associated with innovation; ﬁrms have incentives to innovate
in ways that enhance and extend their market power.4
Most fundamentally, knowledge can be viewed as a public good, and
the private provision of a public good is essentially never optimal.While
intellectual propertymay enhance the appropriation of returns, in doing
so, it introduces a static inefﬁciency, in the restricted use of knowledge.
The myriad of ways by which private and social returns to innova-
tion (with or without patents) differ lead to systemic inefﬁciencies,
both in the level and direction of innovation.5 In the most innovative
economies, governmental policies mitigate the consequences of these
market failures.
2.2. Translating innovation into higher living standards
While it is often taken for granted that innovationmakes society as a
whole better off, this may not be the case. Some innovations may de-
crease the demand for some factors (unskilled labor-saving
innovations6), even as they increase the productivity of others. The re-
sult is that some groups may be better off, others worse off. Innovation
is not, in general, Pareto improving; and if those made worse off are
poor individuals, social welfare is worsened, if we evaluate the change
with an inequality averse social welfare function. Typically, thewinners
could compensate the losers, but inmost societies, they don't. As a result
most citizens can be worse off (cf. the US).
Indeed, recent research has shown how in the presence of imperfect
and costly labormobility, all (or almost all) individuals can beworse off.
If, for instance, there is labor saving innovation in some sector at a fast
enough pace (outpacing the growth of demand), employment and
wages in that sectorwill fall.With imperfectmobility,workers in the in-
novative sector may be trapped. But as their incomes decline, they de-
crease their demand for goods from other sectors. The economy may
enter into a sustained slump.7
There are other reasons thatmost individuals in society can beworse
off in the presence of a faster pace of innovation: in the absence of ade-
quate systems of social protection and redistribution, risk-averse indi-
viduals, uncertain of the effect of the change on their own well-being,
will see a lowering of their ex ante expected utilities.
2.3. National innovation systems
Recent research comparing different economic systems has looked
at markets as just one of many possible institutional arrangements by
which resources get allocated, decisions get made, and risks get shared.
(See, e.g. Hall and Soskice, 2001, and Esping-Andersen, 1990).3 Greenwald and Stiglitz (2014) provide a more comprehensive discussion of market
failures and the ways in which social and private returns differ. For instance, the social re-
turn to faster innovation is the increased present discounted value of beneﬁts from having
the innovation arrive earlier than it otherwise would, markedly different from the private
returns: the ﬁrst to ﬁle the patent gets the entire innovation rents.
4 There are numerous examples of each of these phenomena: patents aimed at enhanc-
ing hold-ups, research on me-too drugs, innovation directed at “evergreening.”
5 See, e.g. Arrow (1962a); Stiglitz (1987b), Greenwald and Stiglitz (2014), and Dosi and
Stiglitz (2014).
6 See, e.g. Hicks (1932).
7 Delli Gatti et al (2012a,b) construct a model demonstrating this, arguing that it pro-
vides an interpretation both of what happened during the Great Depression and what
has been happening in the Great Recession.
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has been a focus on national innovation systems8. The analysis of national
innovation systems calls attention to the multiple inputs into the inno-
vation process (skilled researchers, ﬁnance, the pool of ideas upon
which researchers can draw) and multiple steps in the innovation pro-
cess—from basic research, which underlies many of themost important
advances, to applied research, from “big” innovations to the smaller re-
ﬁnements, which cumulativelymay be farmore signiﬁcant.9 The pace of
these follow-on innovations can be adversely affected by patents—the
most important input into follow-on research is prior knowledge, and
to the extent that the patent system makes access to this prior knowl-
edge more difﬁcult, the pace of follow-on innovation may be slowed.10
The single-minded focus on one part of the innovation process and
one set of determinants (material incentives) may give misleading
views on the overall determinants of the pace of innovation—and pro-
vide misguided policy advice.
For instance, David (2004a, 2004b) and Dasgupta and David (1994),
building on a long tradition of work in the sociology of science (Merton,
1973), have argued that peer recognition is more important than
pecuniary incentives. Societal attitudes—the acceptance of science, the
questioning of authority, the embracement of change—are also pivotal.11
So too, more important than pecuniary incentives in determining
the pace of innovation is the set of innovative opportunities, and the
patent system, combined with cutthroat competition, encourages
ﬁrms to try to take as much out of the available pool of knowledge
and contribute as little to it as they can. The result is that policies (like
stronger intellectual property rights) which, at any given size of the
pool of knowledge, provide stronger pecuniary incentives may lead to
a smaller set of “opportunities” available for others to draw upon, so
much so that the pace of innovationwill, under plausible conditions, ac-
tually be reduced (Stiglitz, 2014a).
Indeed, there is a large literature arguing that strong12 patent sys-
tems undermine innovation, even beyond the important adverse effects
noted earlier in reducing the size of the pool of knowledge from which
others can draw and by increasing the cost of access to knowledge, part-
ly by diverting scarce innovative resources to circumventing and ex-
tending patents and enhancing the monopoly power that is derived
from patents, and partly because of the patent thicket and hold-ups to
which it is increasingly giving rise.138 See Freeman (1995), Lundvall (1992), Nelson (1993), Patel and Pavitt (1994), and
Dosi et al. (1988).
9 See, e.g. Nordhaus (1969).
10 There is an extensive literature detailing the adverse effects of the patent system on
follow-on innovation. A recent dramatic example is provided by the patent on the BRAC
genes (which play a critical role in determining the likelihood that a woman gets breast
cancer.) Before the US Supreme Court ruled against the patenting of genes, Myriad, the
patent holder, suppressed the development of better tests for identifying the presence of
the gene.
11 These attitudes themselves are, at least to some extent, endogenous, and are affected
by the economic and political system.
12 There are many dimensions to a patent system, so that it is not always possible to
identify when one patent system is stronger than another. Some of the adverse effects of
“strong” patent systems derive from particular features, e.g. the absence of well-deﬁned
provisions for “opposition,” resulting in over-patenting (see Henry and Stiglitz, 2010),
the granting of excessively broad patents, or patents lacking in sufﬁcient novelty. Some
of the adverse effects associated with, say, the US patent system could be ameliorated
by patent reform. Others could not.
13 There is a large body of research on each of these topics, and several overall assess-
ments of the contribution of the patent system to innovation. See, e.g. Boldrin and Levine
(2013); Greenwald and Stiglitz (2013, 2014); Heller (1998) Heller and Eisenberg (1998);
Huang andMurray (2008);Moser (2013),Williams (2010, 2013). On the subject of patent
thickets and hold-ups, see, e.g. Budish et al., 2013; Shapiro (2001, 2010). It appears that
the patent thicket is a particular problem in certain sectors, e.g. software and nano-
technology. See European Commission (2008), Clarkson and DeKorte, 2006.
Historically, the adverse effects of the patent system in the development of the automo-
bile and the airplane have been often noted. Most recently, Goldstone (2014) notes that
the attempt by theWright brothers to inhibit follow on innovation had a disastrous effect
on the development of the American airplane industry, to the point where with the onset
ofWorldWar I, no American plane was good enough to go into combat. The industry only
developed once the government insisted on cross-licensing.There are still other reasons that the patent systemmay not lead to a
higher standard of living or a faster pace of its increase. It undermines
the “open” architecture characteristic of the best innovation systems,
which has traditionally been viewed as one of the virtues of research
universities. Openness affects not only the pace at which the frontier
is moved out, but the pace by which frontier ideas disseminate within
a country. Even in the best performing economies, there are large gaps
between best and average practices.14 A reduction in that gap can lead
to substantial increases in productivity and standards of living. Even if
the patent system, for instance, resulted in the frontier moving out
faster, it might actually impede the closing of the knowledge gap.
Strong ﬁnancial incentives especially when combined with the pat-
ent system can actually be counterproductive for other reasons: a
focus on strong ﬁnancial incentives helps create value systems that
put less emphasis on the pursuit of knowledge—so essential for basic re-
searchwhich is the foundation uponwhich all innovation rests—thanon
the conversion of existing knowledge intomarketable products. But un-
less thewellspring fromwhich applied technology draws is replenished
by advances in basic science, eventually the pace of applied innovation
itself will have to slow. Moreover, in science, because peer recognition
plays a far more important role than ﬁnancial rewards, a system that
emphasizes material rewards effectively downgrades the relative im-
portance of the incentive structure that is at the core of science.
Furthermore, a hallmark of American-style ﬁnancial capitalism is its
short-termism, its focus on quarterly returns, which is antithetical to the
undertaking of long-term major innovation.
Moreover, the ﬂow of resources into any activity depends on relative
rewards. The ﬁnancialization of the American economy has resulted in
disproportionately large rewards to those in the ﬁnancial sector, dis-
couraging more talented individuals from engaging in socially produc-
tive research.
Behavior is affected not only by howmuch one wins when one suc-
ceeds, but also the consequences of failure. Research is very risky, and
the amount of risk-taking that is undertaken within any society de-
pends on how risks are mitigated. We argue below that it is not self-
evident that American style capitalism provides the best system of risk
mitigation. National innovation systems involve, of course, more than
the design of ﬁnancial incentives.15 A country's national innovation sys-
tem determines the ﬂow of resources (inputs) into innovation in other
ways. The other vital input into research, besides access to prior knowl-
edge, is trained personnel. This requires an educational system that taps
into the most talented individuals, regardless of the education and in-
come of their parents. The Scandinavian countries have achieved the
highest level of opportunity, the US, the lowest level among the ad-
vanced countries.16
Earlier, we noted that thereweremany stages to the innovation pro-
cess. All innovation rests on the foundation of basic research, which is
overwhelmingly ﬁnanced by government. But government even plays
an important role in ﬁnancing applied research.17 Recent research has
highlighted the role of the entrepreneurial state in promoting innova-
tion. Mazzucato (2013) shows that even the United States has, almost
from the start, been a developmental state, in which government pro-
motes new industries and sectors (such as telecommunications,
through investments in the ﬁrst telegraph line, and creating the Inter-
net), and in which government plays a leading role in increasing pro-
ductivity in established sectors, like agriculture (both through
research and extension services).18 Governments have actually played14 See Baily et al., 1992; Greenwald and Stiglitz (2014) and the references cited there.
15 For a further critique of the role of ﬁnancial incentives, see Dosi et al., 2006.
16 See Stiglitz, 2012a and the references cited there.
17 In theUS, the federal government funds around 30% of R &D andmore than half of ba-
sic research (National Science Foundation, 2014. Figures are for 2011,whichwas themost
recent available data at the time of writing. http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind14/index.
cfm/chapter-4/c4h.htm).
18 Other recent studies of innovation (e.g. Janeway (2012)) have echoed earlier studies
(List 1841) on the importance of the state.
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actually led to greater societal well-being—helping create deep mort-
gage markets and banks oriented to the provision of long-term credit.
The reasons that the government has played this pivotal role can be
closely linked to the “market failures” described earlier in this section.
Diffuse externalities help explain government support of agricultural re-
search. Capital constraints seem to have played a dominant role, espe-
cially in the context of inadequate systems of risk sharing and in
situations where the scale of the required investment is very large.19
In short, creating a learning/innovation economy and society entails
farmore than just establishing strongmonetary incentives; and such in-
centivesmay in fact have an ambiguous effect on the pace of innovation
that increases living standards.20
2.4. The Nordic model, cutthroat competition, market failures, and
innovation
In this section, we address the critical question of “comparative in-
novation systems”: Whymight we expect societies that follow the Nor-
dic model to be highly innovative? By the same token, we ask, if the
United States is the innovation leader, to which of the policies and insti-
tutional structures do we attribute its success? Is it, as Acemoglu et al.
suggest, because of its cutthroat competition? If the Nordic model is
not good for innovation, the question is, what aspects of that model
are most problematic?21
Among the common attributes of the Scandinavian model are low
inequality,22 partly a result of wage compression, partly the result of
tax and transfer policies; strong systems of social protection; strong pol-
icies of gender equity and child protection; high levels of openness; pro-
active industrial and labor policies, including heavy government invest-
ments, efﬁciently executed, in education, technology, and infrastruc-
ture; strong and open democracies, with strong support for a
competitive and critical press and a long tradition of right-to-know
laws. Presumably, critics of the Nordic model are not complaining
about the openness and transparency of government or of its efﬁciency,19 Schumpter (1943) emphasized the importance of capital constraints, e.g. because re-
search (unlike investments in real estate) could not be collateralized. While venture cap-
ital funds have been an important American innovation, providing funds to new research
enterprises, their scope is still very limited, both in scale and across sectors.
20 We could formalize the insights provided in this section by hypothesizing that the
pace of innovation (say measured by the rate of labor augmenting technological progress
in productive enterprises) I, is a function of (a) the level of private investment in innova-
tion, i; (b) the supply of critical inputs, like trainedpersonnel, E (or the cost of such person-
nel, itself a function of E); (c) the set of opportunities, P; and (d) the fraction of the private
investment that goes into socially productive investments, as opposed tome-too-research,
research directed at increasing the ability of private ﬁrms to exploit market power or to
take advantage of others (e.g. by increasing the addictiveness of cigarettes), β; and
(e) the productivity of these investments, e.g. either in terms of how productive inputs
translate into innovations (e.g. as a result of a focus on long term versus short term
returns), or in terms of how quickly these innovations disseminate through the economy,
leading to increased productivity, ζ. Each of these variables, in turn, are a function of the
design of the economic system, e.g. the patent system, the systemofﬁnancial rewards (in-
cluding the progressivity of the tax system), the systems of social and intellectual property
rights protection, the educational system, competition policy, bankruptcy laws, etc. The
nature of ﬁnancial awards is just one factor, and not the most important factor, in deter-
mining the pace of innovation; indeed, the total derivative of the pace of innovation with
respect to an increase in ﬁnancial rewards (the degree of cutthroat-ness of the economy)
may well be negative. Stiglitz (2014a).
21 Any normative discussion of comparative institutional analysis has to address the is-
sue of how one is to assess performance. The analysis of the previous subsection has ex-
plained why we should not focus on an intermediate measure, like expenditures on R &
D, since those expenditures may not be directed at improving societal performance, but
rather at enhancing market power. Commonly, the focus is put on GDP, but a wide body
of research, growing out of thework of the international Commission on theMeasurement
of Economic Performance and Social Progress (Stiglitz et al., 2010) has emphasized the in-
adequacy of that metric (especially if one evaluates welfare using an inequality-averse so-
cial welfare function).
22 Fochesato and Bowles (2014) argue that what is distinctive of the Nordic countries is
not equality in wealth but equality in living standards and in mobility. Blundell et al.
(2014) describe the role that Norway's progressive tax-transfer system plays in attenuat-
ing the magnitude and persistence of income shocks.but rather the diminution of incentives, particularly associated with its
egalitarianism.
Here, I want to argue that there are theoretical grounds for arguing
that the Nordic model may in fact be better for innovation than the
“American” model—suggesting that if the US adopted at least some of
the institutional arrangements that are associated with the Nordic
model, innovation would be higher—and societal welfare would be im-
proved even more.
2.4.1. The meaning of cutthroat competition and its impact on innovation
Acemoglu et al. argue for the American model on the basis of the
stronger incentives that its cutthroat competition provides, the increased
ﬁnancial rewards, and its strong intellectual property protection.23
Assessing the relationship between some notion of competition and the
level of innovation directed at increasing standards of living is, at best, dif-
ﬁcult. More competition in research (to be the next dominant ﬁrm in a
Schumpeterian world with sequential monopolies) may reduce the mar-
ginal return to research and therefore the level of investment of eachﬁrm,
more than offsetting the beneﬁts of having additional researchers. More
competition in the product market typically reduces the scale of produc-
tion of each ﬁrm, and therefore attenuates incentives for cost reduction.
The analysis of the previous subsections, establishing that unfettered
markets lead to Pareto inefﬁcient outcomes, has an immediate implica-
tion: unrestrained markets do not result in the optimal level of socially
productive innovation. Tobe sure, theymay result inmore innovation of
an unproductive form (enhancing, for instance, market power or the
ability of ﬁrms to exploit others). Cutthroat competition can be associat-
ed with actions (such as that of Microsoft) discouraging the entry of ri-
vals, and thus impede innovation. Competition policy restricting such
anti-competitive practices (“cutthroat competition”) will have a beneﬁ-
cial effect on innovation.24
So too, we have explained how stronger intellectual property rights,
even if they lead tomore innovation given a set of technological opportu-
nities, under plausible conditions lead to less innovation because of ad-
verse effects on the set of technological opportunities available for
development.
There are still other interpretations of what might be meant by cut-
throat competition: a culture that gloriﬁes litigation at the expense of co-
operation. But this litigation exerts a large toll on the innovative process,
with some suggesting that as much is being spent on litigation as on re-
search itself (Dosi and Stiglitz, 2014; Cimoli et al., 2014b) and the constant
threat of suit as a result of the patent thicket dampening innovation.25
If cutthroat competition is set in contradistinction to cooperation,
there is another reason that its effects can be adverse: Cooperation is23 Interestingly, inmanymanufacturing sectors, US R&D outlays by the private sector as a
percentage of sales is lower than in other countries. In ofﬁce, accounting, and computing
machinery, in 2008 it was only 13.6%, compared to Sweden's 13.9%; in electric machinery,
it was 2.5%, compared to Sweden's 3.2%, and Japan's 8.0% (France was 3.5% in 2006); in
motor vehicles it is 3.2%, as compared to Japan's 4.4%, and Germany's 5.0% (France was
4.4% in 2006). (OECD Structural Analysis (STAN) database.) (One has to be careful about
the use of reported R&Ddata for certain sectors, such as pharmaceuticals, becausemarket-
ing expenditures are intertwinedwith R&Dexpenditures, contributing to thehigh levels of
reported research in that sector.)
24 There is a large literature showing the adverse effects of such cutthroat competition. It
is, for instance, often associated with attempts to raise rivals' costs (Salop and Scheffman,
1983), socially destructive activities that put one at an advantage over competitors.
Moreover, dominant ﬁrms may engage in ruthless practices to foreclose opportuni-
ties of rivals—the actions taken by Microsoft against its competitors Netscape and
RealNetworks, ﬁrms that were the real innovators, provide telling examples. While
some of its actions were eventually found to violate anti-trust laws, its strategy
worked—the rivals never recovered—with a chilling effect on other potential innova-
tors. There is a large literature discussing the relationship between the level of com-
petition (as measured, for instance, by the number of ﬁrms or by some other measure
of ﬁrm concentration) and the level of innovation. (Scherer, 1967; Aghion et. al.,
2005; Vives, 2008; Gilbert, 2006). But as Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980b) and Goettler
and Gordon (2011, 2014), in general, both the level of competition and the pace of in-
novation are simultaneously determined endogenous variables.
25 The adverse effect of this litigation on the development of key innovations, such as the
airplane, have been extensively discussed (see, e.g. Goldstone (2014) and Stiglitz (2006a).
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large numbers of innovative inputs.26
Finally, “cutthroat competition” could mean a social system in which
there are weaker social protections. We will explain later why stronger
social protectionmay actually have a positive effect on innovative activity.
Acemoglu et al. have constructed a model showing that for one inter-
pretation of cutthroat competition more competition could lead to more
innovation: but the results follow directly from the assumptions; they
are hard-wired into the model. It should be obvious that one can write
down models in which more cutthroat competition or less progressive
taxation or stronger intellectual property rights lead to a faster pace of in-
novation. But that is not the question, for it is equally possible to write
down models with just the opposite results, where strong intellectual
property ormore intense competition leads to lower levels of innovation,
and elsewherewe have done that.27 Contrary to Acemoglu et al., it is sim-
ply not the case that institutional arrangements that lead to more cut-
throat competition will necessarily be associated with higher levels of
investment in innovation, let alone higher standards of living.
Our earlier discussion explained that a society's innovation system is
far more complex. If the US is the most innovative country, there are
many other reasons other than cutthroat competition why this might
be so. The success of the US may have more to do with the large role
played by the government than to the entrepreneurial role of the pri-
vate sector (Mazzucato, 2013). Even when we turn to private sector in-
novation, we ﬁnd a picture quite different from that painted by
Acemoglu et al. Probably the most innovative American ﬁrm during
the twentieth century was a regulated monopoly, largely shielded
from competition, with its research budget funded by, in effect, a tax
on telephone service.28 There are several reasons why that was so:
some of these are related to the fact that because a monopolist has a
larger output (than say a duopolist, where though total output is higher,
the amount produced by each ﬁrm is smaller) it has more incentive to
bring down costs. Moreover, shielded from cutthroat competition, it
could focus on the long run, including the beneﬁts which it might re-
ceive in the long run from investments in basic research.
Elsewhere,we have provided amore general analysis of the relation-
ship between innovation and competition (however assessed), showing
that it depends on a variety of characteristics, e.g. of the stochastic pro-
cess of innovation, the substitutability among goods, the nature of the
market barriers, etc. This suggests that the American model may be
good for innovation in certain areas, adverse in others.
2.4.2. Broad perspectives on institutional design
There are several key aspects of the Nordic model that may be partic-
ularly conducive to innovation. Earlier, we noted the importance of the
(inherent) absence of a full set of risk and capitalmarkets, both for the ef-
ﬁciency of the economy in general and for innovation in particular. Re-
search is risky, and better systems of social protection can thus be more
conducive to individuals undertaking research. Even high taxes can be
conducive to risk taking: the government can be seen as a silent partner,
sharing in the gains as well as losses, with the result that there will be
more risk taking.29,3026 When cooperation is achieved, it is often achieved in a way whichmake it more difﬁ-
cult for new ﬁrms to enter the market. The established ﬁrms create a patent pool, but in-
tellectual property acts as a strong and effective barrier to entry.
27 Greenwald and Stiglitz (2014) and Stiglitz (2014a,b,c).
28 See Gertner, 2012.
29 This is the essential insight of Domar and Musgrave (1944) and Stiglitz (1969). The
details of the tax system affect the extent of risk sharing, and thus the extent to which in-
novation is encouraged.
30 Earlier, we referred to the important role that social attitudes andmores can play: the
Enlightenment was a change inmindset, and that change inmindset was far more impor-
tant than any change in property rights or incentive structures. So too here: attitudes to-
wards failure can affect individual's willingness to undertake risks. The determinants of
these social attitudeswould take us beyond the scope of this paper; but there is a growing
body of research emphasizing the role that government policies can play. SeeWorld Bank
2015.A major input into research is high quality research personnel. With-
out government intervention, because of imperfections in risk and capital
markets,31 there will be insufﬁcient investments in education. In the US,
withheavier reliance onprivateﬁnancing of higher education,with its ad-
verse bankruptcy laws (in which student loans are essentially impossible
to discharge),with the virtual absence of income contingent loans, invest-
ments in education–especially in areas where returns are risky and limit-
ed, such as in science–will be more limited. And access to quality
education by those whose parents have limited income will be greatly
circumscribed.
Worse still, given the high cost of higher education and the skewed
material rewards system, it is not a surprise that a disproportionate
share of themost talented individuals have, in recent years, gone into ﬁ-
nance; and while that may have resulted in a higher level of innovation
in the ﬁnancial sector, it has not resulted in a higher overall pace of in-
novation in the relevant sense—an increase in standards of living, or
the pace by which standards of living increase. Indeed, much of the in-
novation was directed at ﬁguring out better ways of manipulating the
market, exploiting more those who were ﬁnancially unsophisticated,
enhancing the ability to leveragemarket power, and circumventing reg-
ulations that attempted to stabilize ﬁnancial markets and reduce the
risk of large adverse externalities.32 While these innovations may have
generated more rents for those in the ﬁnancial sector, there is no evi-
dence that they improved the overall performance of the economy.
Education is not the only critical factor that is complementary to pri-
vate investments in innovation. Good investments in infrastructure can
increase the returns to private investments (Field, 2011) in general, in-
cluding investments in innovation.
TheNordicmodel,with heavier public investments in education, tech-
nology, and infrastructure, progressive taxation that reduces incentives
for rent seeking, and better systems of social protection, increases the
willingness and ability for innovative risk taking. For an excellent discus-
sion arguing that that is in fact the case, see Barth et al., (2013), and
Moene (2013). They go further, showing that in a vintage model of inno-
vation, wage compression induces older vintages to be scrapped earlier,
thus accelerating the process of creative destruction.33 Moreover, they
show how government policies can ensure that society as a whole bene-
ﬁts from innovations, e.g. through the active labor market policies and
Keynesian demand policies that are part of the “Nordic model.” Further,
the Nordic model can lead to faster dissemination of ideas throughout
the economy (in ruthless competition, ﬁrms strive to keep whatever
knowledge they acquire to themselves).
2.4.3. Speciﬁc policies
There are many more speciﬁc policies in the Nordic model that en-
hance innovation. Consider the narrower question: could innovation
be encouraged by taxing ﬁnancial and land speculation more and
using the proceeds to invest more in education, especially for science
and technology; or to pay scientists more, to attract more into these in-
novative activities? Standard arguments would suggest that higher
taxes on land will not affect the land supply. And given the evident
low (negative) marginal social returns to innovations in the ﬁnancial31 This is not the only reason that there may be underinvestment in education. Some in-
dividuals, particularly from underprivileged families, may not fully appreciate the returns
to education; the assumption of fully rational expectations assumed in conventional
models is clearly wrong. Most individuals rely on public provision of education at the ele-
mentary and secondary level, and theremay be under provision of investments, especially
in communities inwhich there are large numbers of poor individuals, especially in divided
societies where rich individuals have access to private schools.
32 For instance, the gains of the High Frequency Traders occur at the expense others, but
this rent-seeking not only uses real resources makes markets less informative, with ad-
verse effects on the efﬁciency of resource allocation. See Stiglitz (2014e) and Biais and
Woolley (2011).
33 There is a long tradition among economic historians arguing for the innovation bene-
ﬁts of high wages and labor scarcity. See, e.g. Salter (1966), Habakkuk (1962), Sutch
(2010), andWright (1986). For a theoretical discussion, see Acemoglu (2010), Greenwald
and Stiglitz (2014), and Stiglitz (2006b, 2014d).
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Nordic model would presumably be “real” innovation enhancing. Or
consider the slightly broader question: could innovation be enhanced
by taxing those at the top at higher rates, and using the proceeds in a
similar way? It has been argued that because much of the income is de-
rived from rent seeking,34 an increase in taxes at the very top has little
effect on growth (Piketty et al., 2011).
While Section 4 will show that the optimal policy of the leader and
the follower will be different, this analysis suggests it is not necessarily
the case that the leader has less of a “social model” than the follower.
The Nordic model consists of exactly the kind of policies that one would
expect to see in a leader.While itmaynot be optimal for all countries to fol-
low the same model, those countries that aspire to be on the frontier
should at least consider emulating some aspects of the model that has
worked so well in the Nordic countries, not only in maintaining a high
rate of growth in productivity, but high levels and rates of growth in stan-
dards of living.2.5. Political and economic equilibria
The discussion so far has explored the consequences of alternative
economic policies; but as is now widely recognized, public policies are
enacted through political processes, which themselves are affected by
the economy, including by the extent of inequality. We have to view
the economic and political equilibrium as being jointly determined. It
is easy to show that there can be multiple equilibria.35
In particular, there can be an equilibrium with a high level of in-
equality supporting low levels of public investments (including in edu-
cation and technology), low levels of tax progressivity, and high levels of
rent seeking, generating high levels of inequality; and another equilibri-
um with a low level of inequality with high levels of public investment,
high levels of progressivity, a strong welfare state, and strong policies
against rent seeking (the Nordic model). The representative individual
is likely to be better-off in the latter—and so is the pace of innovation.36
There is no reason to believe that the US has adopted the policies that
it has because they are designed to maximize innovation, let alone socie-
tal welfare, rather than because they are simply the outcome of political
processes in which those with money have disproportionate inﬂuence,
an outcome that one might expect given its high level of economic
inequality.37
This analysis suggests that the US could increase the pace of innova-
tion (and the level of economic welfare) by making some moves in the
direction of the Nordic model. Not only would the institutional and pol-
icy reforms promote greater innovation directly, but by reducing in-
equality and the insecurity associated with innovation and openness,
generate more support for innovative policies and ensure that those
displaced by innovation are “recycled”—retrained so that they can be
more productive members of the economy.
Many aspects of the Nordicmodel were explicitly designedwith this
political-economic equilibrium in mind. (See Barth et al, 2012). The
Scandinavian countries are small. To be prosperous, they had to be
open to the outsideworld. But openness imposes high costs onmany in-
dividuals. So too for innovation. And in truly democratic societies, if a34 See Stiglitz (2012a) and Piketty (2014) and the references cited there.
35 See, e.g. Hoff and Stiglitz, 2004.
36 There are multiple links between inequality and the economic-political equilibrium.
More divided societies are less likely tomakehigh return public investments; the rich seek
a weaker state, worrying that it might use its powers to redistribute. See Stiglitz (2012a)
and the references cited there. See also Benabou (1997) for a survey of studies on econom-
ic growth and inequality, and Ostry et al. (2014) for more recent evidence.
37 I say this with some conﬁdence, having watched closely and participated in decision
making in the US, and especially relevant for this paper, decision making related to inno-
vation, such as the design of intellectual property rights and the level and pattern of ex-
penditures on research. Special interests often dominated; the question of what was
good for the progress of science or the advancement of health was given short shrift. For
a discussion of some aspects of this, see Stiglitz, 2006a.majority of citizens are losers—even if a minority are large “gainers”—
it will be hard to sustain policies supporting innovation and openness.
To sustain innovation and openness, one either has to move away
from democracy (e.g. by moving towards a system where money has
more inﬂuence), so that the winners have a disproportionate role in de-
termining outcomes, or one has to ensure that a majority of citizens are
in fact better off—and that is the intention of the Nordic model.3. Historical perspectives and the U.S. experience within a historical
context
Even if the US is the technological leader, there are several possible
explanations, which we cannot adequately assess within the conﬁnes
of this limited paper. But an historical analysis is suggestive. The
United States was not always the leader. In the nineteenth century, it
borrowed voraciously from Europe. (See, e.g. Chang, 2001, 2002). Inter-
estingly, even then, when it was a follower, it had a form of capitalism
that was marked by high inequality—the extremes of the Gilded Age
have only been reached in the Roaring 20s and in the ﬁrst decades of
this century. The innovator of theperiod, Germany,was theﬁrst country
to introduce social security. The pattern clearly seems to be the opposite
of that suggested by Acemoglu et al.
WorldWar IImarked a turning point inUS technological leadership—
a historical accident, partially at least a “gift” of that war, as large num-
bers of those on the forefront of science and technology ﬂed to the US.
This leadership was then reinforced as a result of government actions,
in response to the ColdWar, that led to heavy investments in military re-
search, which had large spillovers to the civilian sector (including, argu-
ably, the development of the Internet.) The large technological
leadership of American universities, reinforced byWorldWar II and gov-
ernment Cold War investments in the decades following the War,
attracted some of the most talented young people from around the
world, many of whom stayed in the United States. But note that none of
these schools are for-proﬁt institutions. They are either not-for-proﬁt or
state institutions.
A closer look at many of the critical inventions and innovations that
have transformed the economy shows that they were not the result of
cutthroat competition. They were ﬁnanced either by government or
by a monopoly (Bell Labs). Innovations attributed to the latter include
the transistor, the laser, the CCD, information theory, and the program-
ming language UNIX.38
If America is the innovation leader, it is hard to ascribe its position
solely, or even mainly, to cutthroat competition. There are, in fact, mul-
tiple institutional and cultural factors that inﬂuence the ability of a tech-
nological leader to maintain that leadership position.39
On the positive side, for instance, America's attitude towards bank-
ruptcy—its acceptance of bankruptcy as part of the price to be paid for
risk taking in an innovative context—and the development of the venture
capital industry are two institutional characteristics that are highly con-
ducive to innovation.40 But even in these areas of strength, there are ques-
tions: US bankruptcy law gives ﬁrst claim to derivatives, and student
loans can almost never be discharged, even in bankruptcy. This distorts
the allocation of resources—towards ﬁnance and away from higher edu-
cation, distortions that almost surely result in less real innovation than
there would otherwise be.38 In addition, thereweremany innovations thatwereof less commercial relevance, such
as the development of radio astronomy. Many of these developments rested in turn on
theoretical insights derived from research in other countries, supported by government
or academic institutions. Aswe noted earlier, Bell labswas essentially funded by a dedicat-
ed research tax on all telephone services. See Gertner (2012).
39 For a more extensive discussion of these issues, see Greenwald and Stiglitz, 2014.
40 ThoughMazzucato (2013) persuasively demonstrates the limited role of theVC indus-
try in innovation. The venture capital industry is a very small part of the ﬁnancial sector,
and was adversely affected by the global ﬁnancial crisis, brought on by the dominant part
of that sector. Kaplan and Lerner (2010) ﬁnd that historically venture capital investments
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the unevenness of the quality of its education—and the evident deﬁcien-
cies in average performance (e.g. as measured in PISA scores41) work in
the opposite direction. So too does the fact that such a large fraction of
its innovative talent has been diverted to ﬁnance (and zero sum activi-
ties within ﬁnance) and other rent-seeking activities.
While large corporationsmay have access to the large amount of re-
sources needed to undertake large, long-term research projects, the
misalignment of interests between management and shareholders and
more broad societal interests, widely recognized deﬁciencies in corpo-
rate governance (leading often to excessive short termism), and the bu-
reaucratic processes that many large corporations have established as
part of their control mechanism, may enervate innovation, especially
of the kind that enhances standards of living.Consumpon possibilies curve 
B
Fig. 1.A: The production possibilities curve is a straight linewith a negative slope of−cA / cM.
First-period equilibrium in the absence of trade occurs at the tangency between the produc-
tion possibilities schedule and the indifference curve, at CMt ⁎, CAt ⁎. B shows the country's
“consumption possibilities curve,” which because of trade is far better than its production
possibilities curve.3.1. Is the US the leader?
The central contention of this paper is that the Nordic model is not
only good for the well-being of most citizens, but that it is also good
for innovation.
But the discussion of the previous section begged the question: Is the
US really more innovative? Establishing that would require showing
that there was a disproportionate ﬂow of innovations, appropriately
weighted, from the putative leader, the US, to the Scandinavian coun-
tries, adjusting, of course, for differences in the size of the two countries.
It should be clear that assessing the level of innovativeness of an econ-
omy is no easy matter. Earlier, we explained that American higher levels
of investment in innovation do not necessarily lead to an enhanced pace
of increases of standard of living overall, and especially so for the typical
household, especially given the marked discrepancies between social
and private returns. Even assessing the importance of any particular inno-
vationmay bedifﬁcult.Moreover, in aworld inwhich knowledgeﬂows in
all directions, assessing the origins of any idea is nearly impossible. For in-
stance, many of America's recent advances in medicine build on work
done in theUnitedKingdombyWatson andCrick leading to thediscovery
of DNA. America's development of the computer rested on fundamental
work done by Alan Turing in the United Kingdom. Parsing out the source
of the “real” innovations is difﬁcult if not impossible.
The Swedish innovation of worker quality circles or the Japanese in-
novation of just-in-time production–neither of which were patented–
may have had more profound impacts on American productivity than
that associated withmultiple patents. To be sure, Scandinavia beneﬁted
from Intel's innovations in chips, but presumably the value of those pat-
ented innovations would be (largely) captured in the proﬁts of the
patenting company, and in the GDP of the originating country.
Interestingly, whilemany suggest that the US has been highly innova-
tive, say in the last thirty-odd years, it doesn't seem to show inGDP statis-
tics, where increases in GDP per capita, or even estimates of total factor
productivity growth, seem to be far lower than in the decades after
World War II. There are several possible explanations for this. Perhaps
GDP does not really capture the improvements in living standards that
computer-age innovation is engendering. This may be partly due to the
fact that GDP does not provide a good measure of well-being (see
Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi, 2010), though there are reasons to believe
that when full account is taken, for instance, of the increase in insecurity,
economic performance is even more dismal than GDP statistics suggest.41 The Programme for International Student Assessment, administered by the OECD,
evaluates 15-year-old students' aptitude reading, mathematics, and science literacy. Ac-
cording to PISA, the US education performs at about the average level of OECD countries
overall, but lags behind the OECD average in mathematics (Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, 2011). The low level of equality of opportunity implies
those born to poor and poorly educated parents are less likely to live up to their potential.
See Stiglitz, 2012a. These adverse outcomes can be thought of as a natural outcome of the
American model of capitalism, which has led to high levels of economic inequality, espe-
cially given the manner in which these economic inequalities interact with political pro-
cesses (as noted in the previous section), leading to low levels of public investments.Alternatively, it may be that as exciting as recent innovations seem,
they are less signiﬁcant than the enthusiasts believe. The United States
may havemade great strides in inventing better ways of targeting adver-
tising, or designing ﬁnancial products that are better at exploiting unin-
formed individuals. It takes innovativeness to design better ways to
exploit and leveragemarket power, and this is likely to showup in higher
proﬁtability. But these “innovations”may not show up in GDP statistics.3.1.1. Macro-data
Data on levels of GDP or its growth (partly for the reasons just allud-
ed to) do not adequately answer even the question of which country is
more advanced or more innovative. Resource-rich countries have high
incomes, but those incomes have little to do with innovativeness. And
the discovery of new resources and their exploitation or an increase in
the price (or scarcity value) of its resources may lead to a high rate of
growth—but this growth cannot be attributed to innovativeness. The
US has beneﬁted from an abundance of natural resources, and certainly
at various times in its history, its growth has been enhanced by the dis-
covery of new resources or an increased ability to exploit them (some of
which may, of course, be related to innovativeness).
Norway's recent growth and its current income per capita exceed
that of the US,42 but that is clearly related to the discovery of oil and
gas. But Barth et al (2013) show that looking over the 80 year period
from 1930 to 2010, Sweden and Norway have had a growth rate that
exceeded that of the United States and other countries of Western
Europe with less strong welfare systems.42 At ofﬁcial exchange rates, in current US dollars, the United States GDP per capita was
$49,965 in 2012, while that for Norway was $99,558. At PPP (current international dol-
lars), Norway's GDP per capita was still considerably greater than the US, at $65,640 in
2012 (2011, 2010). The real GDP growth rate in US was 2.2% in 2012, while this number
in Norway was 3.1%. Source: World Bank DataBank.
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in the US (Norway by 41%, Ireland by 15%, Luxembourg by 30%, Belgium
by .5%), and in several (Germany, France, Netherlands Denmark) the dif-
ferences were small.43,44
By most accounts, Sweden and Norway have a higher standard of
living or welfare (e.g. reﬂected in say median income or UNDP's
Human Development Index).453.1.2. Patents46
Acemoglu et al. try to establish the greater innovativeness of the US
by looking at highly cited patents (registered in theUS patent ofﬁce) per
million residents. Putting aside technical issues, such as differences in
demographics and the presumed lower overall transaction cost associ-
ated with an American registering a patent in the United States versus
a foreigner registering in the United States, there is a more fundamental
issue—patents playmarkedly different roles in different sectors. In some
sectors, like hi-tech and pharmaceuticals, they play a very important
role, though in the former often more in a “defensive” way, to put one-
self in a position to countersuewhen someone sues. In other sectors, like
metallurgy, they play a very unimportant role.
By the same token, the number of citations is not necessarily a good
index of importance. We referred earlier to two critical innovations—
just-in-time production and quality circles. These were not patented,
and accordingly, there is no index of the number of citations. But there
is little doubt of theprofound effects. Or take another Swedish innovation:
dental implants.Whether the original research spawneda large follow-on
research,withmany citations, is not the critical determinant of the impact
that this innovation had on the quality of life of hundreds ofmillions of in-
dividuals. (Moreover, to repeatwhatwe argued earlier: perhaps themost
important American innovations of recent decades—the transistor, the
laser, and the Internet—were the product either of government-funded
research, or research funded by a dedicated tax to the telephone
monopoly.)
And, the most important innovations, generating the most cited re-
search, typically cannot be patented—from the Turing machine, to the
discovery of DNA and electromagnetic ﬁelds.47
In short, itmay be the case that the US is more innovative, in a rele-
vant sense, than some of the Scandinavian countries, adjusted for size.
But the case has yet to be made in a convincing manner. And if it is
more innovative, in some sense, it is not the case that this higher level43 According to OECD data for 2012. And taking into account some of the measurement
problems noted by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and
Social Progress, the US probably had an even smaller GDP per hour worked.
44 The interpretation of such data are open, of course, to multiple interpretations. The
numbers can depend on the degree of vertical integration (if there are some parts of the
production process with higher value added per worker, a country specializing in those
stages of productionmight appear to have higher productivity, even though productivities
in comparable tasks are identical) and themix of skilled vs. unskilledworkers (obviously, a
ﬁrm or country that chose to use unskilled workers would have a lower productivity per
worker, but just as high total factor productivity.)
Data on GDP per worker (which avoid some of these issues) are equally plagued by mul-
tiple interpretations, particularly related to the fact that GDP is not a goodmeasure of eco-
nomic performance, e.g. because of problems associated with health care and “defense”
spending. See, e.g. Stiglitz et al. (2010).
45 In 2012, US ranked #3, Sweden #8, and Norway #1; in the perhaps more relevant (as a
measure of well being) inequality adjustedHDI, US ranked #15, Sweden#3, andNorway #1.
46 There ismuch controversy over the explanations and implications of differences in the
rate of patenting across countries and over time—and the relationship between these dif-
ferences and differences in the pace of innovation (e.g. observed differences may bemore
related to differences over time and across countries in patent laws and their implemen-
tation than to the pace of innovation.) For a brief reviewof some aspects of this controver-
sy, seeDosi and Stiglitz (2014). (For further discussion of these issues, see also; Levin et al.,
1987; Cohen et al., 2000; Schankerman, 1991 and Tellis and Golder, 1996; these studies
not only question the importance of patents, but even the signiﬁcance of the ﬁrst mover
advantage. See also Aghion et al., 2013).
47 And for good reason, related to an assessment of the costs and beneﬁts of patents.of innovativeness is a result of its system of cutthroat competition or
reﬂected in higher standards of living for most citizens.
The USmay have focused its innovative efforts in those sectors where
patents are important andwhere rent-seeking is encouraged (as in the ﬁ-
nancial sector). If this is the case, then from the perspective of global inno-
vation, it may be advantageous to have an ecology in which there are
different institutional arrangements: there is no dominant one.
4. Equilibrium gaps between leaders and followers
In this section, we present a model in which there is an equilibrium
gap between leaders and followers. Those at the frontier balance out the
costs and beneﬁts of pushing out the frontier faster; so too for those be-
hind, whomay have “catching up” policies aimed at closing the gap be-
tween them and the leaders; but they fail to catch up, simply because as
they do so, the leadermoves on. Policies designed to catch up are, how-
ever, different from those designed to move the frontier outward. We
provide a theoretical characterization of these differences, and illustrate
with some relevant policy examples.
4.1. Equilibrium knowledge gaps across countries
4.1.1. Basic model
We assume there are two types of goods—one industrial or
manufacturing (M) and the other agricultural/craft (A), both produced
using only labor as an input with constant returns to scale. We deﬁne
cM cAð Þ≡ amount of labor per unit of industrial agriculturalð Þ
output in the economy:
The production possibilities curve is a straight line with a negative
slope of−cA/cM. (See Fig. 1A.) All individuals are identical with utility
functions among goods of the form (each period)
U ¼ αM ln CM þ 1–αMð Þ ln CA: ð1Þ
CA is the level of consumption of the A-goods, and CM is the level of
consumption of the M goods. The labor supply is assumed ﬁxed.48
If there were a single country, static utility maximization would
occur at the tangency between the indifference curve and the produc-
tion possibilities curve.
Assume now that there are two countries (or two groups of coun-
tries), the developed and the less developed, denoted respectively by
superscripts D and L. Individuals in each have the same utility functions.
The developing country has an absolute disadvantage in all production








To simplify the analysis, we assume the developing country is rela-
tively small. This means that in free trade, the terms of trade are set by
the developed country.
Because the developed country has a comparative advantage in in-
dustrial goods, under free trade, the developing country specializes in
agricultural goods.
Fig. 1B shows the country's “consumption possibilities curve”, which
because of trade is far better than its production possibilities curve.48 This is not an innocuous assumption.One can establish a steady state equilibriumwith
endogenous labor supply only under a restrictive set of utility functions, of which the log-
arithmic utility function is one. If, as here, we assume a ﬁxed labor supply, all that we re-
quire for steady-state analysis is constant elasticity utility functions. This parameterization
simpliﬁes the calculations. Qualitative results would be similar in these more general
models.
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We now introduce technological progress into this static equilibri-
um. We assume that learning-by-doing49 associated with industrial
production within the country is the sole source of productivity in-
creases, but that the learning by any ﬁrm spills over to all other ﬁrms
within the country—both within its sector and in other sectors, i.e.,50
g≡ d lncMð Þ=dt ¼−d lncAð Þ=dt: ð2Þ
Productivity growth does not affect the production costs of industri-
al goods relative to agricultural/craft goods, so that over time there is no
change in comparative advantage.
There is considerable evidence of the presence of substantial spill-
overs. Not only are there technological spillovers, but improvements
in human capital which arise in one sector inevitably confer beneﬁts
on others, e.g. as workersmigrate to other sectors of the economy. Insti-
tutional innovations (like a well-developed ﬁnancial sector which is es-
sential for the functioning of a modern industrial sector) also confer
beneﬁts on other sectors. The assumption that the cross-sector spill-
overs are perfect is, of course, a polar case. We can loosen this assump-
tion, but none of the qualitative results depend on it.
For all countries, the rate of technological progress increases with
the output of the industrial sector or its input of labor or its relative
size, measured say by the proportion of labor force allocated to the in-
dustrial sector, π, or the ratio of the outputs. For simplicity, we take
the latter view: While in an industry with larger production, there can
be more learning, what happens in one part of the industry has to dif-
fuse to the rest of the sector.We assume that that these effects just offset
each other.
We further assume that the follower country's growth also depends
on the gap in knowledge between the developed and less developed
country.
gD ¼ fD πD;1
 
; ð3aÞ
gL ¼ fL πL; κ
 
: ð3bÞ
where κ = cDM/ cLM, the gap in productivity in the industrial sector,
κ b 1. We assume that (in the obvious notation) fL2 b 0 for κ b 1
(recalling that a larger value of κ means a smaller gap); and fL2 = 0
for κ≥ 1, i.e. learning in the countrywhich ismore advanced is unaffect-
ed by the state of the less advanced country.51 For simplicity, we assume
fD(πD, 1) = fL(πL, 1),52 for πD = πL and where there is no loss of ambi-
guity, we drop the superscripts on g and f. For later reference, we as-
sume f12 b 0, i.e. the greater the knowledge gap, the greater the
marginal return to learning (at any value of π).49 There is a large literature on learning by doing, with empirical work even pre-dating
Arrow's (1962b) development of the theory. For a more recent review of some of this lit-
erature, see Greenwald and Stiglitz (2014). An important aspect of technological progress
is learning to learn. See Stiglitz (1987c).
50 Again, this assumption greatly simpliﬁes the analysis, but the results can be general-
ized. Note, however, that if there are imperfect spillovers, each ﬁrmwill take into account
the reduction in its future costs from increased production as a result of learning-by-doing.
Firms that produce more will face lower costs. The competitive equilibrium will not be
sustainable.Withmany commodities, there can exist amonopolistically competitive equi-
librium. This model is very similar to that of Matsuyama (1992), except he assumes no
spillovers. This changes the results in important ways. See Stiglitz (2014f).
51 fD does not depend at all on κ. We write the equation in this way simply for conve-
nience. Even countries that are, in general, behind may make innovations from which
the leader beneﬁts (America learned from Japan's just-in-time inventory control system).
There are learning beneﬁts from the laggard to the leader. Extending the model to incor-
porate this effect is straightforward.
52 When there is no knowledge gap, they have the same learning functions. In fact, even
when there is no knowledge gap about technology, there can still be a gap in learning
capacities.The crucial assumptions that distinguish this model from conven-
tional growth theory are that productivity growth is endogenous and
that knowledge does not ﬂow freely across borders. In conventional
growth theory, the rate of growth is exogenous, not affected by any-
thing the ﬁrm (or society) does.53 While some forms of knowledge do
move easily across borders, many others (tacit knowledge, knowledge
related to the conduct of particular institutions) may be far less mobile
than labor or capital.
With free trade, the global general equilibrium is easy to describe. For
the large, developed country, with full learning spill-overs, each ﬁrm
takes the state of technology next period as given – unaffected by what
it does itself – and hence the competitive equilibrium in the absence of
trade is the same as it was without learning, represented by the tangency
of the indifference curves to the production possibilities locus.We denote
the competitive equilibrium levels of output by {CM*, CA*}.
The small developing country takes prices as given, essentially set by
the large developed country at its relative cost of production, and so the
developing country specializes in agriculture.
Under free trade, because the developing country specializes in agri-
cultural goods, with no knowledge spillovers from the developed to the
less developed countries, the developing country stagnates.
4.1.3. Long-run analysis with industrial policies
Assume instead that the developing country directly controls produc-
tion, allocating a fraction π of its labor force to producing industrial goods,
so its income (using agricultural goods at time 0 as our numeraire) is Y=
π k+ (1− π), where k= cLM / cDM b 1 represents the lower productivity
associated with industrial production.54 Then, using Eq. (1)
U ¼ αM ln 1 ‐λð Þ þ 1 –αMð Þ lnλþ ln Y ¼ U ð4Þ
where λ is the proportion of income allocated to agricultural goods.
U, short runutility, ismaximizedbymaximizingY, andY ismaximized
at π= 0; that is, the country specializes in the production of agricultural
goods, as noted above. It is also easy to show that λ= 1− αM.
We now put this into a dynamic setting, asking how taking into
account learning beneﬁts affects resource allocations. The present dis-
count value of utility is
W ¼∑ δtUt; ð5Þ
where δ is the utility discount factor. We focus on the steady state
solution, where whatever policy is optimal at time t is optimal at
time t + 1.55 This means that we can rewrite Eq. (5) as56
W ≡ U þ δ ln 1þ gð Þ=1‐δð Þ½ = 1–δð Þ: ð6Þ
Optimality requires (for an interior solution)57
∂U  =∂ln π þ fππ δ = 1 – δð Þ 1þ gð Þ ¼ 0: ð7Þ53 In standard “convergence” models, knowledge ﬂows freely from one country to an-
other, so that, effectively by assumption, κ=1. In this Ricardian version of the neoclassical
model, convergence occurs instantaneously. If capitalﬂows freely, even if savings rates dif-
fer, output per capita will be the same in different countries, but incomes will differ.
54 k is a measure of the difference in comparative advantage; κ is a measure of the differ-
ence in absolute advantage in the industrial sector.
55 A full analysis would entail a more complicated dynamic programming formulation.
The steady state analysis conveys the key issues at play.
56 Ut + 1=Ut+ ln (1+g), and, using standard techniques,W=ΣU0[(1+n(ln (1+ g)))
One parenthesis has been added to balance the delimiters. Please check that this was done
correctly, and amend if necessary.]δt, from which Eq. (6) follows directly.
If U is not logarithmic but exhibits constant elasticity with respect to the scale of con-
sumption, there is a parallel analysis.
57 If at π= o, ∂U* / ∂ln π+ f π π / (1− δ) (1 + g) b 0, then there can be a corner so-
lution at π= 0, and if at π= 1, ∂U* / ∂ln π+ f π π / (1− δ) (1 + g) N 0, there can be a
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Fig. 2. A: Assume the country, rather than specializing in agriculture, produces some
manufactured goods, and then trades agriculture goods to buy the rest of the
manufactured goods it desires. Its new consumption possibilities curve is depicted in
Fig. 2A, decidedly inferior to the “free trade” solution. B showswhat happens in future pe-
riods. Because now there is learning, which beneﬁts both sectors, the production possibil-
ities curve has moved out. Even with the trade restriction, the consumption possibilities
curve is better than in the free trade solution. There is a trade-off: a loss in well-being in
the short run, for a gain in the long run.
59 It would be an easy matter to generalize this to the case where the lagging country is
non-negligible in size, and continues to import some industrial goods. We would then
need an additional equation to solve simultaneously for πL* and πD*.
60 Because we postulate that the economy is in steady state (the knowledge
gap is ﬁxed), the analysis is greatly simpliﬁed. Along the ﬁrst order condition
Wπ = 0, d π / d κ = −Wπκ / Wππ.
The denominator is always negative, so that the sign of d π / d κ is the same as that ofWπκ,
and the sign of Wπκ is the same as that of (f π κ / f π)− (f κ / 1 + f). We expect that an in-
crease in κ reduces growth (when there is less catching up, there is less growth, at a given
level of π), and that an increase in κ also reduces themarginal beneﬁt of increasing π. In ef-
fect, we assume that the marginal effect dominates. But if the knowledge gap is too large,
the knowledge that accumulates in the developed country is less and less relevant to de-
veloping countries.
12 J.E. Stiglitz / Journal of Public Economics 127 (2015) 3–16Taking into account the learning (growth) beneﬁts, the increase in
future utility, so long as f π N 0 (there is a marginal beneﬁt to growth
from expanding the industrial sector) and δ N 0 (the country cares
about the future); optimality requires that ∂U*/∂ln π b 0, i.e. π N 0.
The country should produce some of the industrial good, even though it
is not its comparative advantage (and under our assumptions, never will
be). The dynamic beneﬁts of learning exceed the static costs. Industrial
policies pay off.
What is at issue is illustrated in Fig. 2A and B. Assume the country,
rather than specializing in agriculture, produces some manufactured
goods, and then trades agriculture goods to buy the rest of the
manufactured goods it desires. Its new consumption possibilities
curve is depicted in Fig. 2A, decidedly inferior to the “free trade” solu-
tion. But Fig. 2B shows what happens in future periods. Because now
there is learning, which beneﬁts both sectors, the production possibili-
ties curve has moved out. Even with the trade restriction, the consump-
tion possibilities curve is better than in the free trade solution. There is a
trade-off: a loss inwell-being in the short run, for a gain in the long run.
Eq. (7) says that it always pays to impose some trade restriction.
The greater the learning beneﬁt and the higher δ (the lower the dis-
count factor), the higher π, the larger the industrial sector; that is, the
higher the optimal static distortion.58
A similar analysis follows for the Leader. Denote byπDo the value of π
in the developed country in the free trade-no industrial policy equilibri-
um. So long as f1(πDo, 0) N 0, it pays for the developed aswell as the less
developed countries to undertake industrial policies.58 This follows from the fact that that ∂U* / ∂ π = − (1 − k)/Y b 0 and
∂2 U* /∂ π2 = − (1 − k)2 / Y2 N 0. There is always a marginal cost to increasing
π, but the larger is π, the smaller is Y, and therefore the larger is the marginal cost.4.1.4. Steady state gaps: the normal case
In steady state, the less developed country stays a certain distance






where, it will be recalled,we have assumed for simplicity that the devel-
oping country is very small relative to the developed, so that the devel-
oped country's equilibrium value of π (essentially) depends on its own
internal conditions.59 (That is πD* is set simply by the demand for indus-
trial goods domestically, and depends on whether it undertakes indus-
trial policies).
Eq. (8) deﬁnes a positively sloped curve (is depicted as the upward
sloping “steady state curve” (SS) in Fig. 3) between κ and πL: as κ in-
creases, the pace of learning slows (there is less to learn), and so for
the developing country tomaintain the same distance from the frontier,
πL must be increased.
The steady state solution is deﬁned by the solution to Eq. (8) and the
ﬁrst order condition for the less developed country's welfaremaximiza-
tion, which we write in reduced form as
Wπ ¼ 0: ð9Þ
κ is the state variable describing the less developed economy— its “state
of knowledge” relative to the developed country. For each value of κ
there is an optimal value of π:
πL ¼ P κð Þ: ð10Þ
This is the proﬁt maximizing (PM) curve. This is normally negatively
sloped, so long as the marginal return to growth from increasing π di-
minishes as κ increases.60
There is thus a unique solution, as depicted in the ﬁgure: a steady
statewith a value of κ= κ* b 1 (implying thepersistence of a knowledge
gap of a given size)with a value of πL that is less thanπD. This iswhatwe
label as the normal situation, when it doesn't pay the developing coun-
try to close the knowledge gap, but it does pay it to deviate from static
comparative advantage (and to do so persistently) so as not to fall too
far behind—so that it can learn more effectively from the developed
country advances in technology which are of beneﬁt to all sectors of
its economy. Even though the country would beneﬁt from spillovers
even if it didn't have an industrial sector, it would get fewer spillovers.
The infant never fully grows up, but to keep up with big brother, he
has to continue to have industrial protection. There is a beneﬁt to
being the laggard: it is able to maintain the same rate of growth of the
developed country by taking advantage of the knowledge that ﬂows
down from the developed country with a smaller fraction of its labor
force allocated to the industrial sector. It can take some advantage of
its comparative advantage in agriculture.The full optimization problem is somewhat more complicated, because if the knowledge
gap is closed, next year's optimization problem is different from this year's. The full opti-
mization problem can be solved using standard techniques. The result is still that the op-
timal labor allocation π will depend on the state variable κ. The results described in the
following paragraphs depend only the relationship between π and κ having the indicated
properties.
Fig. 4. This ﬁgure shows the impact of industrial policies in advanced countries. If the ad-
vanced country pursues an industrial policy, g* will be higher than it otherwise would








Fig. 3. The steady state equilibrium, showing the long run allocation of labor to
manufacturing and the steady gap between the leader and the follower. Along the steady
state locus, SS, as κ increases, the pace of learning slows (there is less to learn) at any value
ofπL, and so for the developing country tomaintain the samedistance from the frontier,πL
must be increased. The steady-state equilibrium entails the catching-upﬁrm remaining al-
ways behind. The PM locus shows the proﬁt maximizing value of πL for any value of the
gap. As the gap increases, we assume not only does the level of learning at any πL increase,
so does the marginal return to “learning by doing,” so πL increases.
13J.E. Stiglitz / Journal of Public Economics 127 (2015) 3–16Other possible conﬁgurations may emerge: the infant may catch up;
it may be optimal to have no industrial policy, simply absorbing what-
ever knowledge trickles down to it; and there can be multiple equilib-
ria—countries can be trapped in a low level equilibrium marked by a
high knowledge gap, but with a positive enough boost, can move into
a better steady state equilibrium, with higher levels of consumption
and a much smaller gap with the leading countries. (See the Stiglitz
(2014e) for the conditions associated with each of these possibilities.)
4.1.5. Impact of industrial policies in advanced countries
The steady state equilibriumdepends onwhether the advanced coun-
try pursues an industrial policy (i.e. takes into account that its growth rate
g can be affected by its labor allocation). If it does (and our previous anal-
ysis showed that normally it would want to do so), g* will be higher than
it otherwise would have been, so πL has to increase, at each κ, i.e. the SS
curve, deﬁned by (13), shifts up. This in turn means that (a) in steady
state, the developing country will also have a higher growth rate; but
(b) it will have to have a stronger industrial policy, i.e. a greater distortion
in the static allocation of labor; and (c) the equilibrium gap between the
developed and the less developed country will be larger. (See Fig. 4).
4.2. Optimal policies for leaders and followers
So far, we have assumed that there is a single policy (industrial pol-
icy) that can affect growth. But countries have at their disposal a large
range of policies that might affect growth. We generalize Eq. (8) de-
scribing the rate of growth of the economy to61
g ¼ f π; κ; ςð Þ; ð8′Þ
where ς is any growth enhancing measure,62
∂g=∂ ς N 0:
We assume further that there is a short run social cost of thesemea-
sures beyond a certain level, ς* that maximizes short run utility. Thus,
we write the short run (momentary) utility as
U  π;ςð Þ
with ∂U*/∂ ς b 0 for ς N ς*.61 The growth functions of the two countries could themselves differ. Here, we argue
that even if the growth functions are identical, policies will still differ.
62 It is of, course, possible that somemeasures increase growth over some range, and de-
crease growth over others. We ignore this possibility in this paper.The leader (the large, developed country) maximizes long-term so-
cial welfare with respect to ς, taking into account the short run costs
and the long run beneﬁts. It follows that the leader sets ς N ς*.
The follower goes through a similar exercise, but for the follower,
κ b 1 (in contrast to the leader, where κ = 1, by deﬁnition), and
πL b πD. The marginal growth beneﬁts of increasing ς will be affected
by the growth cross elasticities between ς, κ, and π. Policies which are
growth enhancing for the leader (for whom κ= 1) may not be growth
enhancing for the followers, or may be much less so.
It follows that unless the growth equation (8′) is separable between
ς, on the onehand, and κ and π on the other,63 the optimal value of ς for
the leader will differ from that of the follower(s), even if they have the
same preferences: economic policies designed for advancing the techno-
logical frontier are different from those that optimize “catching up,” bor-
rowing technologies from others.
Assume, for instance, ς stands for “basic research” and that the level
of basic research required to maintain a knowledge gap—given that
knowledge is ﬁltering down in any case—is less than that required for
moving the frontier forward at the rate g*. Then the follower (the devel-
oping country) should do less research than the developed country.
Sometimes, however, there has been an underappreciation of what
is required to close the knowledge gap—or to prevent the knowledge
gap from growing. At one time, theWorld Bank encouraged developing
countries to devote essentially all of their educational resources to pri-
mary education, with very little allocated to university education.
While well-intentioned, the effect of such policies was that the coun-
tries that followed them fell increasingly technologically behind. The
1998 World Development Report, Knowledge for Development (World
Bank, 1998) helped bring about a reversal of that policy. If ς is
interpreted as “university education,” while ςL b ςD, it argued that
still, ςL N 0.
There are active debates about the role of different policies for both
leaders and followers, e.g. concerning the role and design of pecuniary
incentive structures, including intellectual property rights, the impor-
tance of openness and collaboration, and the impact of inequality and
competition. Theoretical results appear to be heavily dependent on par-
ticular assumptions, and empirical results remain contingent and
unsettled.
While in many respects, leaders would do well to follow the Nordic
model—consistent with the analysis of Section 3 suggesting that the
Nordic countries were in fact innovation leaders — and, with appropri-
ate modiﬁcation, so should followers, there are some dimensions in
which markedly different policies might be appropriate. An intellectual
property regime which is designed to move the frontier out as fast as
possible may be markedly different from an intellectual property63 That is, since the followerwill always face a different value of κ and, in general, have a
different value of π, in general, without separability, the optimal value of ςwill differ.
14 J.E. Stiglitz / Journal of Public Economics 127 (2015) 3–16regime that is designed to close the gap between the technology at the
frontier and technologies prevailing within a laggard country.64
If frontier research is more risky, policies that enable individuals
within society to cope with those risks will be more important in fron-
tier countries, unless risk aversion diminishes sufﬁcientlywith increases
in income. If thewinner-take-all processes that characterize the frontier
countries lead to greater inequality, given imperfections of capital mar-
kets discussed in Section 2, it may be especially important for a frontier
country to have a strong public education system that guarantees access
to education for all, if the human resources of that country are to be ef-
ﬁciently deployed. These observations suggest that a Nordicmodel may
be particularly relevant for the leader.
In short, “optimal” policies for innovationmay be similar in some re-
spect to, but differ markedly in others, from those which are conducive
to enhancing imitation (catch up); but contrary to the assertion of
Acemoglu et al. variants of the Nordic model may actually enhance
well-being in both.4.3. Extensions
The central model that we explored is one in which there are full
spillovers across sectors, so that if the less developed country initially
has a comparative advantage in agriculture/crafts, it always does. That
means that if the countrywants to have an industrial sector, it must per-
manently provide some protection. It is perhaps incorrect to say that the
infant never grows up: productivity in manufacturing may increase
enormously, and the gap between productivity in that sector in the de-
veloped and developing country may narrow markedly. But because of
the assumption of full spillovers, comparative advantage never changes.
This has one very important implication:
Even if it were true that infant industries sometimes never fully growup,
the support provided by the government to the industrial sector pays
off: the economy is on a long-term faster growth trajectory than it oth-
erwise would have had.
But a country like Korea represents the more typical story, where as
it learns, productivity in the industrial sector increases faster than in ag-
riculture, so much so that eventually the country's comparative advan-
tage changes. That means that eventually government intervention to
maintain a (relatively) large industrial sector – larger than would be
the case under unfettered market forces – is no longer required. But
even after the country achieves some success in improvingmanufactur-
ing capacities, it may still want to intervene, to produce more
manufacturing goods than it otherwise would have produced, or more
broadly, to encourage the expansion of those sectors with higher learn-
ing and innovation potential, and higher learning and innovation
spillovers.
Of course, the uncoordinated equilibrium that emerges is not global-
ly efﬁcient. Because the leader does not take into account the beneﬁts of
the innovation that “trickle down” from it to the followers, it will engage
in too little innovation, adopting policies that are less supportive than
would be desirable from a global perspective. Itmay also undertake pol-
icies that excessively inhibit theﬂow of knowledge from itself to the fol-
lowers. There is obviously a role for global collective action, for
addressing the market/government failures that arise when each coun-
try pursues the policies directed solely at enhancing thewell-being of its
own citizens.64 Thus, theWIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization)General Assembly adopted
a proposal from Brazil and Argentina on October 4, 2004 calling for a developmentally ori-
ented intellectual property regime, as opposed the regime incorporated into the TRIPS
agreement, which was widely seen as impeding access to knowledge, and thus
development.4.4. Concluding comments
This paper is an exercise in comparative economic systems, asking
what kind of an economic system most enhances welfare, focusing es-
pecially on innovation and the production and dissemination of knowl-
edge. Rather than beginning from the presumption that there is a single
economic system that is best for all countries, it recognizes that different
countries may be inmarkedly different situations: there are leaders and
followers.What is optimal for a leader, trying tomove the frontier ahead
(and perhaps maximizing its innovation rents) may be different from
that which is optimal for the follower, trying to take advantage of
knowledge produced by others, trying to catch up, or at least not fall
behind.
We have begun our analysis by a brief articulation of the multiple
market failures that characterize innovation and the production and
dissemination of knowledge. There is no presumption that unfettered
markets will be optimal, in either the level or direction of investments
in research. There is a presumption that there are government interven-
tions that will enhance welfare.
Central to our analysis is the idea that the production anddissemina-
tion of knowledge is different from the production and dissemination of
conventional goods; and the presumptions and understandings of what
leads to good economic performance relevant for the latter may not be
relevant for the former. Standard economic models assume that knowl-
edge disseminates easily (and typically, costlessly) within and between
countries. There is, however, overwhelming evidence that there are
large and persistent differences in knowledge within and between
countries. That this is so has profound implications. It means, for in-
stance, that reforms that improve the efﬁciency with which informa-
tion/knowledge gets transmitted within and between countries can
have a far more profound effect on standards of living than those that
improve the allocative efﬁciency of the economy, especially when
such reforms simultaneously impede the ﬂow of knowledge. It implies
that simple injunctions for ﬁrms (countries) to become leaders, to
move to the technological frontier, are of little relevance.
We have formulated a simplemodel inwhich countries can close the
gap with the technological leader—but there is a cost to doing so, and
the cost is sufﬁciently high that a country may choose to remain a
laggard.65 There exists an international equilibrium, in which there are
leaders and followers.66
Market failures affect both the supplies and prices of inputs into in-
novation aswell as the risk-adjusted private and social returns. TheNor-
dicmodel can be thought of as addressing in a fairly comprehensiveway
these market failures. Policies affecting education, social protection, es-
pecially of children, unions, public investments in technology and infra-
structure, active labor market policies, industrial policies—all of these
not only affect societal wellbeing directly, but also the pace of innova-
tion. Though there are some features of the American form of capitalism
that are conducive to innovation, there are others that are not; and that
while there may be questions about precisely how strong its economic
performance has been, say in comparison to the Nordic countries, it is
clear that what success it has attained can only partially be attributed
to its markets and its form of cutthroat capitalism: some is a result of
a historical accident, some can be attributed to its not-for-proﬁt univer-
sities, some to strong government support.
We have argued that there is a strong role for government to play in
both the leader and the follower countries, in designing policies that
lead to more innovation or ensuring that the knowledge gap doesn't65 The fact that there are a few countries, such as Korea, which have gone a long way in
closing the knowledge/technological gap, is not necessarily inconsistent with the hypoth-
eses put forward in this paper. Such countriesmay haveunderestimated the cost of closing
the gap,may have unusually low time discount factors, ormay face distinct circumstances
in which the costs of closing the gap are unusually small.
66 There are othermodels generating non-convergence. In the appendix to theNBER ver-
sion of this paper, we discuss the important differences between our model and that of
Krugman (1981) and Matsuyama (1992).
15J.E. Stiglitz / Journal of Public Economics 127 (2015) 3–16increase, and in ensuring that innovations disseminate well within the
economy and that most citizens beneﬁt. As we noted, without the ap-
propriate frameworks, innovations can lead most citizens to be worse
off, even if the winners could have compensated the losers.
In democracies, whether governments adopt policies that facilitate
innovation will depend on the consequences of innovation for most cit-
izens. The Nordic model, by ensuring that more of its citizens beneﬁt
from innovation and growth, has created a virtuous circle: a political re-
gime that supports policies that facilitate innovation and ensures that
the beneﬁts of the resulting growth are widely shared.67References
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